Fotogeniotampico

Scope: Este análisis es exclusivamente una lectura técnica y de riesgo basada en lo visible en CertiK Skynet para el proyecto Vanar Chain (página: Vanar Chain – CertiK Skynet Project Insight).
No es auditoría formal, no es recomendación de inversión y no infiere cosas que no estén soportadas por evidencia pública en Skynet.

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0) Metodología (controlada)

Fuente única: CertiK Skynet (panel del proyecto).
Objetivo: identificar señales técnicas verificables, límites de evidencia, y riesgos residuales plausibles desde perspectiva de ciberseguridad y due diligence.

En cada punto marco:

- Hecho verificado: aparece explícito en Skynet
- Inferencia razonable: consecuencia lógica limitada desde lo visible
- Sin evidencia pública (en Skynet): no se puede afirmar

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1) Snapshot de evidencia (lo que Skynet sí confirma)

Identidad del activo observado (Hecho verificado)

- Proyecto: Vanar Chain
- Token/contrato mostrado (Ethereum): 0x8de5b80a0c1b02fe4976851d030b36122dbb8624
- Deployer (Ethereum): 0x6CAF72f26231B7c240794184723B4a199FaB21A9

Scores Skynet (Hecho verificado)

- Skynet Score: 81.73 (A)
- Sub-scores:
- Code Security: 65.71
- Operational: 82.85
- Governance: 84.11
- Fundamental: 71.10
- Market: 92.90
- Community: 98.00

Lectura técnica: “A” general puede coexistir con áreas específicas débiles; aquí Code Security es el sub-score más bajo del set mostrado.

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2) Evidencia de auditorías y verificaciones (gobernanza y control humano)

Auditorías (Hecho verificado)

- CertiK Audit: No
- 3rd party audit: Sí
- Auditor listado: Beosin
- Fecha publicada (Skynet): 01/09/2025
- Total audits disponibles: 1

Inferencia razonable: existe al menos un reporte público accesible desde Skynet (aunque el contenido/alcance del PDF no se evalúa aquí).

KYC / Team Verification (Hecho verificado)

- CertiK KYC: No
- 3rd party KYC: No
- Estado: Not Verified By CertiK

Bug bounty (Hecho verificado)

- CertiK Bounty: No
- 3rd party bounty: No

Implicación técnica directa (inferida): no hay señal pública en Skynet de un canal económico formalizado de “continuous security testing” vía bounty.

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3) Token Scan (riesgo a nivel token/contrato mostrado)

Token Scan Score (Hecho verificado)

- Token Scan Score: 67.74

Concentración de holders (Hecho verificado)

- Top 10 Holders Ratio: 41%

Inferencia razonable: una concentración del 41% en top10 es un vector relevante para:

- shocks de liquidez por movimientos coordinados
- cambios abruptos en distribución de oferta
- dependencia de actores grandes

Señales de centralización (Hecho verificado, pero con limitación)

Skynet muestra categorías de checks como:

- Mintable, Hidden Owner, Proxy Contract, Tax Can Be Modified, Blacklist/Whitelist, Transfer Pausable, Can Modify Balance, Ownership Not Renounced, etc.

Sin evidencia pública (en lo visible):
El panel enumera los checks, pero no expone aquí cuáles están marcados como “true/false” en detalle (eso usualmente está en “View Findings / Full Scan”).
Por disciplina: no afirmo que Vanar tenga cualquiera de estos flags activos sin ver el detalle.

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4) Riesgo de custodia y dependencia de exchanges (estructura de mercado observable)

CEX Holding Analytics (Hecho verificado)

Skynet muestra:

- Wallet Discovery: 15 exchanges
- Market cap held en CEX: $11.39M
- % Market cap held: 53.73%
- “Top exchanges by holding”:
- Binance: $9.69M (45.79%)
- Bybit: $927K (4.30%)
- Bitget: $291K (1.35%)
- Otros (Crypto.com, Indodax, Kucoin, CoinDCX, Ascendex, etc.)

Inferencia razonable (técnica, no narrativa):

- Hay una dependencia estructural de infraestructura CEX para custodia/liquidez.
- Esto introduce riesgo fuera del control del protocolo:
- congelamientos / compliance / incidentes CEX
- concentraciones de flujo y price discovery
- correlación de riesgo operacional ajeno al chain stack

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5) Salud operativa y “observability posture” desde Skynet

Incident History (Hecho verificado)

- “No security incidents in the past 90 days.”

Limitación técnica (Hecho verificado): es una ventana “last 90 days”, no una garantía histórica completa.

Monitor (Hecho verificado)

Skynet muestra Skynet Active Monitor, pero:

- Website: Not Activated
- Code Repository: Not Activated
- Smart Contract: Not Activated
- Social Media: (monitor existe, pero estado visible indica no activación a nivel de monitor del proyecto)

Inferencia razonable: el monitoreo en Skynet no está configurado como control operativo continuo desde esta vista.

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6) Website Scan (infra/app/DNS) — qué se puede y no se puede concluir

Skynet lista:

- Network Security: “0 Attentions”
- App Security: “0 Attentions”
- DNS Health: “0 Attentions”

También se muestran checklists típicos (ej. HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, SPF/DMARC/DKIM, SSH weak cipher, etc.)

Hecho verificado: el panel reporta “0 attentions” por categoría.
Sin evidencia pública: no se expone aquí el detalle técnico verificable (hosts exactos, puertos, resultados raw, timestamps de scan).
Inferencia razonable: es un escaneo point-in-time; no sustituye revisión de infraestructura/CI/CD.

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7) Métricas de madurez y uso (señales de adopción operativa)

Project maturity (Hecho verificado)

- Maturity Indicator: Medium / Somewhat Developed
- Project Age: 5 yrs 2 mos
- Token Launch Date: 2 yrs 2 mos
- Market Cap (mostrado): ~$20M (Skynet lista 20M)

Actividad (Hecho verificado)

- Active Users (7d): 246
- Transactions (7d): 1,997
- Token Transferred (7d): $10.66M
- Most Active Timezone: GMT+6 & GMT+7 (muestra: Maldives, Pakistan, Kazakhstan)

Inferencia razonable: actividad no trivial pero aún moderada en usuarios; transferencias 7d relativamente altas comparadas con usuarios (posible concentración de flujos).

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8) Límites de confianza (qué Skynet NO permite verificar aquí)

Con evidencia únicamente de esta vista, quedan fuera:

1) Arquitectura formal del protocolo (L1/L2/app/DA)
- Sin evidencia pública (Skynet view): descripción técnica completa del stack y su capa exacta.
2) Repositorios oficiales / commits / releases
- Sin evidencia pública en el panel visible: links a GitHub, paths, tags, CI.
3) Modelo de gobierno real
- multisig, llaves, timelocks, upgrade authority: no verificable aquí.
4) Estado real de flags críticos del token
- proxy, mintable, blacklist, pausability, ownership: requiere abrir “findings”.
5) Garantías cuantitativas / invariantes
- safety/liveness, límites operativos, condiciones de fallo: no aparecen.

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9) Riesgo residual (integrado SOLO con lo verificable)

Sin severidad y sin mitigaciones; solo persistencia lógica:

R1) Riesgo residual por evidencia incompleta de “Code Security”

- Hecho verificado: Code Security 65.71 (sub-score más bajo).
- Implicación: superficie de incertidumbre técnica en implementación (no confirmable desde este panel).

R2) Riesgo residual por concentración de holders

- Hecho verificado: Top10 holders ratio 41%.
- Implicación: dependencia de comportamiento de grandes tenedores (riesgo sistémico de liquidez/distribución).

R3) Riesgo residual por dependencia de custodia CEX

- Hecho verificado: 53.73% de market cap held en exchanges identificados.
- Implicación: riesgos fuera del control del protocolo (operación CEX, compliance, incidentes).

R4) Riesgo residual por ausencia pública de KYC/bounty (según Skynet)

- Hecho verificado: sin CertiK KYC y sin bounty listados.
- Implicación: menor “señal operacional” de incentivos y accountability continua (esto NO prueba inseguridad, solo limita evidencia).

R5) Riesgo residual por monitoreo no activado

- Hecho verificado: monitores “Not Activated” en Website/Repo/Contract.
- Implicación: menor trazabilidad operacional automatizada desde el stack Skynet.

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10) Preguntas de verificación (para investigación técnica real, no para hype)

Si estás haciendo due diligence serio, estas son las preguntas que Skynet deja abiertas:

1) ¿Dónde está el repo oficial y cuál es el pipeline de releases/CI?
2) ¿El contrato es proxy/upgradable y quién controla upgrades?
3) ¿Existen mecanismos on-chain de pausado/blacklist/mint y están habilitados?
4) ¿Cuál es el modelo de seguridad formal (invariantes, límites, supuestos)?
5) ¿Qué componentes críticos dependen de infra externa (RPC, indexers, servicios)?

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11) Debate técnico (elige una opción)

A) “El principal riesgo aquí es concentración y estructura CEX, más que bugs.”
B) “El principal riesgo es falta de evidencia primaria de código/arquitectura en esta vista.”
C) “El principal riesgo es gobernanza (controles humanos no verificables desde Skynet).”
D) “Con esta evidencia, aún no se puede priorizar nada con rigor.”

Responde con A/B/C/D y continúo con el siguiente bloque que tú indiques, manteniendo el mismo estándar “audit-ready”.
@Vanarchain
$VANRY

Multi-Source Public Evidence Approach
Purpose: Technical reading of observable risks and evidence gaps for due diligence (non-marketing).
Real Scope: Architecture (declared), public implementation (official repos), operation/perimeter (website scan), and external signals (Skynet + on-chain explorer + market metrics).
Out of Scope: Exploit write-ups, line-by-line code auditing, or claims without evidence.
🎭 Multicolor Analysis Map (7 Layers)
🔴 Red (Attack): Real surfaces that could be exploitable based on existing architecture.🔵 Blue (Defense): Currently observable signals and telemetry.🟣 Purple (Integration): Linkage between Attack ↔ Detection ↔ Preservable Evidence.⚪ White (Supervision): Institutional controls, traceability, and formal audit gaps.🟡 Yellow (Structure): Facts vs. Gaps; repeatable checklist.🟠 Orange (Lab): Elements for empirical validation with minimal infrastructure.🟢 Green (Forensic): Capturable evidence for timeline and correlation.
0) Evidence Pack v0.2 (Sources Used)
Primary (Project/On-chain): Official Documentation, Whitepaper v3.0.0, Official GitHub (org), "Rusk" node (Rust), Official Node Installer, "dusk-protocol" repo (WIP), and Etherscan (ERC-20 DUSK).External Signals: CertiK Skynet Project Insight (useful for signals, not formal proof), CoinMarketCap (market data/consistency checks).
1) 🟡 Minimum Technical Identity
Verified Fact (Docs/Whitepaper): Dusk presents as a "privacy" blockchain for regulated finance with privacy and compliance primitives.Verified Fact (Public Implementation): An operational stack and node in Rust (Rusk) exist with associated tooling.Verified Fact (Observed Asset): Skynet/Etherscan point to the ERC-20 token on Ethereum: 0x940a2db1b7008b6c776d4faaca729d6d4a4aa551.GAP (Not Verifiable): Full formal protocol guarantees, updated quantitative invariants, and a final published official threat model (ref: "dusk-protocol WIP").
2) 🟡 Declared Architecture vs. Public Implementation
2.1 Design (Claims): Whitepaper v3.0.0 describes a ledger with Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus. Official docs describe privacy + regulatory requirements.2.2 Real Implementation (Auditable):Rusk: Node client and smart contract platform (supports local execution/builds).Node-Installer: Official tool for Mainnet/Testnet/Devnet deployment.dusk-blockchain (Go): Legacy/Deprecated; replaced by the Rust implementation.dusk-protocol: Formal documentation still marked as "WIP" (explicit evidence of incompleteness).
3) ⚪ Assurance Signals (Audit, KYC, Bounty)
3.1 Audits: Skynet indicates "Not Audited by CertiK / 3rd Party Audit: No."Audit-Ready Gap: Without a traceable public report (Findings → Fixes → Commits), code assurance remains weak based on public evidence.3.2 KYC / Team Verification: Skynet indicates "Not Verified." This represents a verification vacuum in available telemetry.3.3 Bug Bounty: No formal bounty recorded. No public signal of an incentivized disclosure channel.
4) 🟢 Observable Surface (Web Perimeter + Public Telemetry)
4.1 Web Perimeter (Website Scan): Missing hardening headers (X-Frame-Options, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, CSP).Limit: This affects the web interface; it does not prove vulnerability in the core protocol.4.2 On-chain Evidence (Etherscan):Data Quality Check: Etherscan shows Max Total Supply = 500,000,000 DUSK, while CoinMarketCap lists 1,000,000,000.Audit-Ready Implication: Supply inconsistency between on-chain sources and aggregators. In technical diligence, the on-chain explorer is prioritized.
5) 🔴 Attack Surface (Evidence-Based)
A) Node/Chain: Local compilation/execution (Rusk) → P2P/RPC vectors, state management, and input validation.B) Deployment: Node-installer → Operational/human surface (misconfigurations, versioning).C) Crypto Primitives: Multiple ZK repos (e.g., PLONK, curves) → Critical internal supply chain; changes in these libraries are high-impact.D) ERC-20 Token: Supply/Holder concentration can amplify custodial and liquidity events (operational-market risk).
6) 🔵 Available Defensive Signals
Direct Observables: Repository status (activity, deprecations), official documentation scope, and web posture signals from scanners.On-chain Metrics: Token supply, holders, and transfers via explorers.GAP: No publicly observable production telemetry (SLOs/SLAs), complete runbooks, or formal end-to-end Incident Response.
7) ⚪ Critical GAPS for Formal Auditing
Incomplete Formal Specification: Repo "dusk-protocol" is still WIP. Quantitative invariants are not 100% verifiable.Lack of Traceable Assurance: No public audit reports with findings/remediation history.Missing Operational Runbooks: Secure operation depends on the operator without a public operational contract/manual.
8) 🟠 Laboratory Validation (Empirical)
Local Node (Rusk): Build/test, basic stability, version drift, and induced process/network failures (requires local environment).Reproducible Installation: Clean install, rollback, and environment consistency (Mainnet/Test/Dev).Dependency Chain: Monitoring changes in the organization's ZK/Crypto libraries.
9) 🟢 Minimum Forensic Evidence (Reproducible)
Snapshots of Docs/Whitepaper (SHA256 hash of PDF).Snapshots of Repos (Tags/Commits).Snapshot of Etherscan token overview (Supply/Holders).Snapshot of Skynet Website Scan findings.
Operational Conclusion
Through multiple public sources, Dusk shows real evidence of implementation (Rust node + tooling) and a solid academic base. However, significant institutional audit gaps remain: formal documentation is "WIP," there is an absence of traceable public assurance, and supply data contradictions exist between aggregators and on-chain explorers.
End of Report.
$DUSK
@Dusk
#DuskNetwork #Web3Security #CryptoAudit #ZeroKnowledge

@Walrus 🦭/acc
Architecture, Attack Surface, Evidence, and Operational Limits
Multicolor Framework (Red · Blue · Purple · Yellow · Orange · Green · White)
Executive Summary
Walrus is a decentralized storage and data availability (DA) protocol designed for large-scale blobs, integrated closely with the Sui blockchain for on-chain coordination, metadata, epochs, and payments. It is neither an L1 nor an L2; it operates as a distributed storage layer with availability guarantees based on erasure coding and assumptions of an honest fraction of nodes.
This article presents a comprehensive Web3 cybersecurity analysis, built exclusively on public primary evidence, covering:
Architecture and critical assets.Trust boundaries and security assumptions.Implemented attack surface.Design, implementation, and operational flaws.Empirical laboratory validation.Detection capabilities and forensic evidence.Purple Team integration (Attack ↔ Detection ↔ Evidence).Explicit security scope limits and critical missing evidence.
No mitigations, severity ratings, or commercial judgments are issued.
🟡 Yellow — Architecture and Technical Evidence (Archivist / Sage)
Position in the Stack
Walrus positions itself as a Decentralized Storage / Data Availability layer, with on-chain coordination on Sui. Blob availability is linked to on-chain objects representing metadata and operational state.
Critical Assets
Blob availability (recoverability).Data integrity (encoding, verification).On-chain state and metadata (Sui).Operational continuity via epochs and committees.Incentive economics (WAL).Client APIs / SDKs.
Trust Boundaries
Sui: Assumed honest under its own consensus model.Storage Nodes: Untrusted individually.Clients: Adversarial by default.Network: Untrusted.
Explicit and Implicit Assumptions
Sufficient honest fraction of nodes.Liveness and safety of Sui consensus.Aligned economic incentives.Correct reconfiguration across epochs.Note: There is no public evidence of a formal threat model or comprehensive quantitative thresholds.
🔴 Red — Adversarial / Attack Simulation (Assassin)
The adversarial surface focuses on HTTP services that trigger on-chain actions, specifically:
Publishing endpoints (store).Reading/aggregation (concat, ranges).Authentication via signed tokens (JWT).Local state persistence (sub-wallets).Direct dependency on external RPCs.
Plausible Vectors Include:
Concurrent flooding inducing on-chain costs.Token replay under pressure.Crash/restart during critical windows.Local state manipulation.Inducing failures in external dependencies.
The attack focus is operational and protocol-based, rather than cryptographic or consensus-driven.
🔵 Blue — Defense and Detection (Hunter / Ranger)
Observable defensive capability is based on:
HTTP codes (429/5xx) as pressure signals.Metrics exposed by services.Process and supervisor logs.Correlation with on-chain events/transactions.Token validation (jti, exp).Local administrative endpoints.
Clear Limits:
No attribution of intent.No complete internal visibility of encoding.No native detection of key compromise.Causality of Sui failures is external.
🟣 Purple — Attack ↔ Detection ↔ Evidence Integration (Alchemist)
The Purple Team analysis demonstrates that:
Each adversarial vector produces observable signals (HTTP, metrics, logs, events).These signals can be forensically preserved with reproducible hashes.Partial traceability exists from HTTP → on-chain event.Gap: Lack of a standard end-to-end request-id limits perfect correlation.
The attack-detection-evidence matrix is executable in a lab environment and reproduces degradation without breaking protocol assumptions.
🟠 Orange — Empirical Validation (Engineer / Builder)
The protocol allows for realistic laboratory testing of:
On-chain actions triggered by HTTP.Read/aggregation pressure.Authentication and anti-replay.Local state persistence.Backup/restore and version drift.Minimum observability.
Not validatable in a lab: Real chain consensus/liveness, large-scale Byzantine adversaries, real economic incentives, or global quantitative guarantees (due to lack of public specification).
🟩 Green — Forensic Evidence and Chain of Custody (Druid)
Walrus leaves reproducible forensic artifacts:
HTTP and process logs.Service metrics.On-chain events and transactions.Signed tokens (if captured).Persisted local state (wallets, DB).Snapshots and backups.
Inevitable Limitations: Volatile memory data, unenabled/rotated logs, uncaptured traffic, non-reversible encrypted secrets, and dependency on third-party clocks.
⚪ White — Security Limits and Scope (Paladin / Oracle)
The following are explicitly out of scope for the protocol:
Sui security and liveness.Confidentiality of blob content.Operational hardening of the environment.Key and JWT custody.End-to-end IR/SLOs as a formal contract.Consolidated quantitative invariants.Formal vulnerability disclosure policy.Public formal verification.Signed binary provenance.
Conclusion
Walrus presents a technically sophisticated design for DA and distributed storage with strong on-chain integration. Its security emerges from a combination of cryptographic assumptions, coordination delegated to Sui, and the operational discipline of the operator.
From a Web3 cybersecurity perspective, the system is analyzable and testable, though not yet fully specified in an "audit-ready" manner within a single public artifact. This analysis consolidates all layers under a coherent multicolor framework for the first time.
$WAL
$SUI #WalrusProtocol #SuiNetwork #DataAvailability
MYCELIOGUARDS