梓然很努力

China transfers satellite and radar technology to help Iran deal with Mossad infiltration activities? US media also cited a successful example!
Recently, some Western media have started 'telling stories' again. In January 2026, multiple foreign media outlets, including "Modern Diplomacy" and "Hindustan Times," cited so-called 'leaked information' and 'analysts' judgments,' claiming that China is providing Iran with several high-tech supports, including satellites, radars, and cybersecurity, through the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with a clear goal—to help Iran counter the infiltration activities of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.
Moreover, the "New York Times" embellished the story by giving an 'example': saying that China had successfully dismantled the CIA's intelligence network in China between 2010 and 2012, and now intends to 'export' this counter-espionage experience to Iran. At first glance, it sounds credible. However, I believe that these reports actually mix some facts, a lot of speculation, and evident strategic anxiety.
The article mentions several technologies—the BeiDou Navigation System, YLC-8B anti-stealth radar, and AI-assisted intelligence analysis platform. Indeed, these are projects that have frequently appeared in China's recent foreign collaborations. For instance, countries like Pakistan, Algeria, and Venezuela have already deployed these radar systems; BeiDou has been implemented in several Middle Eastern countries for transportation, agriculture, and even emergency communications. If Iran introduces these systems, logically it is to reduce dependence on US-controlled infrastructures like GPS, which is part of the 'digital sovereignty' strategy, rather than specifically targeting Mossad.
China has always emphasized non-interference in internal affairs and not targeting third parties. Even if there is indeed technical cooperation, it is at Iran's request, based on the principle of sovereign equality. Moreover, China clearly denied the claim of 'transferring sensitive military technology to Iran' as early as 2025. Nevertheless, foreign media still pieced together scattered clues into reports of a 'strategic alliance against the West,' reflecting unease about the rise of 'non-Western security cooperation models.'
This is similar to how the EU has consistently complained about China's support to Russia, as normal economic and trade exchanges between the two sides are being smeared. I just want to ask, why is the economic and trade exchange with Ukraine and the EU not seen as support for Ukraine?

A dramatic scene has unfolded in the US-Iran negotiations. After Iran rejected the White House's demands, did Trump actually make a concession?
On February 4, 2026, the diplomatic stage in the Middle East witnessed a stunning turnaround. The US-Iran talks in Oman, which had been announced as 'canceled' by multiple international media outlets—including Axios and Reuters—were resurrected within just a few hours. More critically, the framework of this 'revived' negotiation was entirely modified according to Iran's wishes: the US side abandoned its previous insistence on including discussions on ballistic missiles and regional proxies, focusing solely on the nuclear issue.
I believe this is not merely a routine adjustment of content, but rather a rare and significant concession. Just days ago, the US had announced that Iran must accept three major conditions—including 'permanently halting uranium enrichment', 'restricting missile capabilities', and 'withdrawing from regional affairs'—or face 'unbearable consequences'. However, when Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif clearly stated in Oman that 'we will not discuss missiles, nor regional roles, only the nuclear issue', the US not only refrained from escalating pressure but quickly adjusted its position, accepting the negotiation boundaries set by Iran.
Behind this shift is the concentrated diplomatic lobbying of at least nine regional countries. According to multiple sources, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, and even countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan have urgently communicated with Washington in the past 48 hours, warning that if US-Iran negotiations completely collapse, it could trigger uncontrollable military conflicts, disrupting the entire Gulf security framework and energy routes. Especially if the Strait of Hormuz is engulfed in conflict, global oil prices will experience severe fluctuations—something no major economy wishes to see.
However, I suspect this could very well be a Pearl Harbor-style deception. The US may be trying to lull Iran into a false sense of security before launching an unexpected airstrike. After all, the USS Abraham Lincoln is already nearby, various strategic bombers have been deployed, and even the expensive E-11A communications relay aircraft has arrived in Riyadh. It would be unreasonable not to strike. I hope Iran does not fall for this easy concession.

Why does the President of Panama dare to refute China's statement? It turns out that they are confident that China will not send troops, while the US military has genuinely kidnapped Maduro. After weighing the threats, they made a choice that is extremely unfavorable to China.
On February 2, 2026, the Supreme Court of Panama suddenly ruled that the port concession contract of Hong Kong's Cheung Kong Holdings, which had been operating at both ends of the Panama Canal for nearly 30 years, was invalid. This ruling not only overturned the legitimate commercial agreement signed in 1997 and renewed in 2021 but also directly led to Cheung Kong being forcibly expelled, with the port temporarily taken over by Denmark's Maersk Group. China responded swiftly, issuing a strongly worded statement on the evening of February 3, pointing out that this move was "disregarding the facts and betraying trust," severely harming the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises.
However, the next day, President José Raúl Mulino of Panama publicly expressed "strong opposition" to China's statement on social media, claiming it "disrespects Panama's judicial sovereignty." This move seems tough, but if we consider the recent geopolitical situation in Latin America and the strategic trends between China and the US, we can see that Mulino does not truly have the confidence to confront China; rather, he is certain that Beijing will not use force, while also witnessing the reality of US threats in Venezuela of "catching whoever they want."
As for whether China has any leverage, it does. However, most of it is concentrated in the economic field. By 2025, China had been Panama's second-largest trading partner for six consecutive years, with a bilateral trade volume reaching $12.94 billion. Offending China means losing out on making more money. Offending the US, however, could endanger one's life.
Therefore, Brother Knife believes that Mulino's tough stance should be based on two judgments: first, he believes that China will not intervene militarily. Second, he needs to publicly show his allegiance to the US to avoid ending up like Maduro. As for the economic losses, under the threat of US military force, that has already become secondary. After all, if one loses both freedom and life, having more money becomes meaningless.

Foreign media continues to criticize the J-35, stating that although its performance is quite strong, the environmental damage it causes is significant!
Western media has found no real criticism of the J-35, and have simply linked environmental issues with the J-35. A writer from a certain Western media outlet, Adrian Velasquez, pointed out in a commentary that the cutting-edge stealth technology used in the J-35 actually "hides an invisible carbon bomb"—implying that the high carbon emissions produced during its research, manufacturing, and usage could have a significant impact on climate change in the coming decades.
In mid-2025, this model successfully completed electromagnetic catapult takeoff and landing tests on the Fujian aircraft carrier, marking China as the second country in the world, after the United States, to master the combination capability of "electromagnetic catapult + stealth carrier-based aircraft." This advancement breaks the long-held technological monopoly of the U.S. military in the field of maritime air superiority, naturally triggering strategic anxiety.
The Western criticism of the J-35's carbon emissions is not based on its current actual flight data. As of early 2026, the J-35 is still in the initial phase of limited batch production, with a very limited number of flight hours per year. In contrast, the global delivery of the U.S. F-35 series aircraft has exceeded 1,000 units, serving in over 20 countries, and regularly conducting high-intensity training, overseas deployments, and even combat missions. According to the U.S. Department of Defense's 2024 report, the F-35 fleet alone consumes over 500 million gallons of aviation fuel each year, with carbon emissions far exceeding any single new fighter jet program.
However, Velasquez and others choose to selectively ignore this comparison, instead emphasizing the "future trend": once the J-35 is mass-produced and widely deployed, its carbon footprint over its entire lifecycle will sharply increase. This projection, while having some theoretical basis, clearly carries a preset premise—that is, assuming that China's military expansion will inevitably lead to environmental degradation, while the emissions from the existing large U.S. military system are seen as a "given fact" or "necessary cost."
Isn't this clearly a case of allowing officials to set the fire while forbidding the common people from lighting a lamp?

Indians are very smart. After the failure of the Kaveri engine, they decisively turned the setback into an opportunity!
India’s "Weekly" on February 2 reported that the "Kaveri" aircraft engine project, after nearly twenty years of twists and turns, has officially confirmed it will not be used for its original goal—the LCA "Tejas" light combat aircraft—but will instead provide power for drones. The article praises that this is not the end of the accident, but the starting point of a strategic shift.
Tests show that the maximum thrust of the Kaveri prototype is about 72 kilonewtons, while the thrust required for the LCA is between 83 and 85 kilonewtons. Although the gap may seem small, in the field of aerospace engineering, it is enough to render an engine incapable of performing combat missions. Continuing to forcibly integrate would not only hinder the aircraft's performance but could also endanger flight safety. The Indians have considered this quite thoroughly.
Faced with this technical bottleneck, the Indians did not choose to "force it through," nor did they completely abandon the entire project. Instead, they adopted a pragmatic and forward-looking strategy: to "downgrade the use" of the Kaveri engine—removing the afterburner and adapting it for unmanned combat platforms. India’s "Weekly" highly praises this approach, considering it extremely clever.
In recent years, the Indian military's demand for high-altitude long-endurance drones and attack reconnaissance drones has risen rapidly. The requirements for engines for these platforms are vastly different from those for manned combat aircraft: they place greater emphasis on reliability, fuel efficiency, and sustained operating capability rather than instantaneous high thrust. After removing the afterburner, the Kaveri has reduced weight and simplified structure, making it more aligned with the power needs of drones. More importantly, it retains a considerable portion of the core technology accumulation from independent research and development—including compressor design, combustion chamber layout, and control systems—these are the foundations for more advanced engines in the future.
Samir V. Kamat, head of DRDO, recently stated: "Engine development is a long process." He gave an example that globally, it usually takes 10 to 13 years for a military aircraft engine to go from project initiation to mature integration. This means that even if India starts a new generation military engine project now, it will not complete acceptance testing until at least 2035-2036. The Kaveri is truly a case of turning waste into treasure, and of course, if drones also find the Kaveri unsatisfactory, there could be new uses, right?

On February 3, 2026, the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Lincoln was conducting routine operations in the Arabian Sea when an F-35C carrier-based fighter jet shot down an Iranian Shahed-139 drone. On the surface, the U.S. military's actions appeared very assertive, but according to the Pentagon, the Iranian drones had been "flying close" to U.S. aircraft carrier groups almost daily, and this engagement seemed more like a breaking point after long-term restraint by U.S. pilots.
At that time, the USS Lincoln was located in international waters about 800 kilometers from Iran's southern coast. While this position is far from Iranian territory, it is not out of reach for Iran's operational medium-range drones. The Shahed-139 has a maximum range of over 2000 kilometers and possesses long endurance capabilities, making it fully capable of taking off from within Iran to conduct reconnaissance deep into the Arabian Sea or even dive in a show of force.
In recent weeks, Iran has frequently dispatched various types of drones, including the Shahed series and smaller tactical models, circling around the periphery of U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. These flight patterns indicate that they were not merely passing through but repeatedly approached U.S. ships in a low-altitude, slow-speed, and highly maneuverable manner, sometimes even entering the inner layer of the aircraft carrier's defense zone—this behavior has been described by the U.S. military as "unnecessary and provocative maneuvers."
U.S. Central Command spokesperson Hawkins clearly pointed out that prior to the incident, the U.S. military had taken "de-escalation measures," including radio warnings, changing flight paths, and deploying electronic countermeasures, in an attempt to drive the drone away. However, the other side did not respond and continued to approach.
Knife Brother thinks that the U.S. military is playing the victim; you have already gone to someone's doorstep to attack them, and you still don't allow them to conduct reconnaissance? More likely, the U.S. military is preparing to test the strike capabilities of carrier-based aircraft. In this context, the F-35C, as the outermost rapid response force of the aircraft carrier's air defense system, undertook the strike test mission.

The Chinese Coast Guard's 10,000-ton ship is indeed powerful; the Japanese Coast Guard vessel "Akitsushima" was crushed, and the Americans must be watching in astonishment!
Recently, a scene played out in the South China Sea that might be more tense than many military exercises — China's Coast Guard ship 5901, a "maritime behemoth" with a displacement of over 10,000 tons, began its journey south after rendezvousing with another new-type Coast Guard ship 2504 west of the Bashi Channel at the end of January. Its target was the Japanese Coast Guard's "Akitsushima" patrol ship.
According to the vessel's Automatic Identification System (AIS) and multiple tracking data, the "Akitsushima" was originally scheduled to head south from the Okinawa direction, intending to approach the waters near our Nansha Islands. However, once it entered the South China Sea, it was firmly locked on by the 5901. The two ships maintained close proximity for a time, during which the Japanese side made multiple attempts to change course, accelerate, or decelerate in an effort to shake off the tracking, but they were ultimately unsuccessful. In the end, the "Akitsushima" could only choose to return the same way and abandon its original mission.
Why is this tracking action so noteworthy? First, 12,000 tons, equipped with a helicopter deck, advanced radar, and communication systems, and even possessing certain capabilities for withstanding waves and long-range sustained operations. In contrast, while the "Akitsushima" is also a mainstay vessel of the Japanese Coast Guard, it only displaces about 3,300 tons, making it difficult to compete with the 5901 in terms of speed endurance, equipment configuration, or maritime presence capability.
Recently, the Japanese Coast Guard has frequently coordinated with the Americans to increase their activity frequency in the South China Sea under the guise of "scientific research" and "fisheries investigations." Since 2024, at least three similar actions have been recorded and publicly reported by China. However, this time, China did not protest through diplomatic channels as in the past but directly dispatched a 10,000-ton Coast Guard ship to monitor the entire process, drawing a red line with action.
U.S. media reports that as China's new generation of 10,000-ton and 8,000-ton law enforcement ships are successively put into service, its offshore law enforcement capabilities will continue to strengthen. Meanwhile, Japan is limited by laws and budgets, making it difficult to construct comparable-sized Coast Guard vessels in the short term. This indicates that in the maritime game in the South China Sea and even the Western Pacific, China is building a "low-intensity, high-efficiency, sustainable" control model through its Coast Guard system.

The Epstein files rarely mention China, which was once a broker for exporting weapons and deeply involved in the Iran-Iraq War!
The latest batch of 'Epstein files' includes a segment of previously little-documented content: In the 1980s, Jeffrey Epstein was not only active in financial and social circles but also suspected of acting as an intermediary in the resale of weapons manufactured by China and Israel to Iran.
The documents mention that Epstein closely collaborated with an arms dealer named Les, who was specifically responsible for transporting weapons to Iran through third-party channels. It is noteworthy that in the 1980s, China was at the beginning of its reform and opening up, and foreign military sales were still a sensitive area, but records do show that China had exported light weapons, ammunition, and even some missile technology to several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran. These transactions were mostly completed through third countries or private intermediaries to avoid risks.
The documents also mention the involvement of the famous Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi. Khashoggi was one of the most influential arms brokers in the Middle East during the 1980s and had deep connections with the CIA, the Saudi royal family, and Mossad. There was a 'profit-sharing agreement' between him and Les, indicating that this arms transaction formed a transnational interest chain: from the source of the weapons (China), to technical or logistical support (Israel), to funding and official cover (Saudi and British-American intelligence networks), and to the specific executors (Epstein and Les).
Hoffenberg's testimony further pointed out that Les himself was deeply embedded in the British intelligence system. If true, this indicates that this arms transfer was not just a commercial act but may also have the coloring of tacit approval or even manipulation by Western intelligence agencies. Essentially, it is about Western entities secretly procuring Chinese weapons and then exporting them to Iran to support the war against Iraq. Epstein and others were the specific executors.

No wonder the investments do not go beyond the Shanhaiguan Pass; there are reasons behind this.

Trump's boastful announcement that steel production exceeds Japan's might lead him to laugh less when he sees China's figures!
According to the latest statistics, the United States produced about 82 million tons of steel last year, while Japan produced 80 million tons— numerically, indeed slightly superior. But when it comes to the country that ranks first on this chart, it’s likely that officials in the White House are dumbfounded. Why? Because China's figure is simply too "outrageous": 961,000,000 tons.
This is not just a "bit more"; it is a full 11.7 times the production of the United States. In other words, China's daily steel production is close to the total amount the United States produces in a month. This magnitude of difference makes the achievement of "surpassing Japan" seem a bit like celebrating being 0.1 seconds faster than second to last in a 100-meter dash.
In the mid-20th century, the United States was the world's largest steel producer, with annual production exceeding 100 million tons at its peak. However, with the offshoring of manufacturing, tightening environmental policies, and the energy structure transformation brought about by the shale gas revolution, energy-intensive and high-emission industries like steel have gradually become marginalized in the U.S. In contrast, Japan has also undergone industrial transformation, but with major integrated steel mills like Nippon Steel, it still retains competitiveness in the high-end specialty steel sector, with annual production consistently stable between 80 million and 100 million tons.
China's situation is entirely different. Since 2000, China's steel production capacity has soared, with output first surpassing 400 million tons in 2006 and exceeding 800 million tons in 2014. After 2020, due to the "dual carbon" goals, crude steel production began to be reduced, but the base is simply too large. The 961 million tons in 2025 is actually the result of three consecutive years of voluntary production cuts—had it followed the natural growth trend, it could have potentially surpassed 1 billion tons.
More critically, China's steel production capacity is not only massive but also highly concentrated. The production of Hebei province alone consistently exceeds 60 million tons, equivalent to the total production of Germany or South Korea. The annual production capacity of Baowu Steel Group alone approaches 140 million tons, higher than the combined total of the U.S., Japan, and Germany.
So, why does the U.S. still emphasize "surpassing Japan"? There is logic behind this. In the context where Japan remains a G7 member and a traditional industrial power, surpassing it is packaged as a symbol of "manufacturing returning" and "revitalizing industrial might." Especially with the election year approaching, such data can easily be used as a tool to boost blue-collar voter confidence. But the reality is that the U.S. steel industry is no longer an economic pillar. The production of 82 million tons only accounts for about 8.5% of global output, while China alone accounts for nearly half (around 48%).

The latest Epstein files have been exposed, accusing China of discovering American backdoors, describing them as a group of country bumpkins!
The latest batch of declassified Epstein case files reveals a private chat record between him and former White House strategist Steve Bannon. Although this conversation has not been officially verified in full, from the content, I think it feels very real.
According to the chat record, Bannon describes the Chinese as "a group of country bumpkins trying to manage the world economy." Epstein responded that the core topic of a closed-door meeting he just participated in was discussing how "these country bumpkins" identified long-embedded backdoor tools from the U.S. within their own information systems, and he complained that China had begun attempting to reverse exploit these vulnerabilities to protect its own interests, even seizing U.S. interests.
I also don't know how Epstein qualifies to attend such meetings; he probably doesn’t even understand the backend code. But Bannon, as a White House advisor, has the authority to access some classified briefings. In Epstein's eyes, the approach not only "doesn't understand the rules" but also "dare to reverse-engineer the tools of the rule-makers," challenging the long-held logic of American technological hegemony.
People like Epstein, who navigate the core circles of power in Washington, are more practical: once the backdoor is uncovered and weaponized, it not only weakens America's intelligence advantage but may also expose its operational traces in global finance, communications, and even electoral interference.

After being violently shot at by four gunmen, Gaddafi's son was turned into a beehive, and it's still his fault for being too high-profile and lacking political acumen!
On February 3, 2026, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi of Libya was killed at his residence in the western city of Zintan. Multiple sources unanimously indicate that he was shot to death at close range by four masked armed men in his own garden, suffering multiple gunshot wounds, with a horrific scene at the site.
It is worth noting that the location of his death is still tightly controlled. Although the mainstream narrative points to Zintan—a city that has long been under the control of local militias since the 2011 civil war—there are also unverified reports claiming that he was actually intercepted and executed while heading south from Garyan in the Al-Hamda region. The attackers acted swiftly, had clear targets, and displayed high tactical coordination.
More critically, this assassination was not an unorganized street violence. Reliable security channels have revealed that there is a connection between the operation and the Libyan National Army's 444th Brigade. Although this brigade is nominally part of the Libyan National Army (LNA) system, it operates with a high degree of autonomy and is often used as a quasi-military unit to carry out sensitive 'clearing tasks.' Clearly, this time they chose to act at a critical juncture when Saif was attempting to return to the political stage, as he had publicly expressed his intention to run for president and garnered support from former subordinates in some regions—indicating that this assassination had strong political motives, aimed at completely erasing the potential for the Gaddafi family's political comeback.
Saif's identity is itself full of contradictions: he holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and has presented himself as a 'reformer'; in the ten years following Gaddafi's death, he went through arrest, a death sentence, a pardon, and a period of seclusion, before making a low-profile comeback in recent years, remaining a 'living symbol' in the power struggles of Libya. His existence represents both a potential threat and a useful bargaining chip for certain forces. Now, this piece has been directly physically removed.

Iran's attempt to detain a U.S. cargo ship failed, and a drone was shot down by an F-35; this action served as a wake-up call for China!
On February 3rd, the U.S. Central Command confirmed that an F-35C carrier-based fighter jet from the 'Lincoln' aircraft carrier strike group, deployed in the Arabian Sea, shot down an Iranian 'Shahed-139' drone in international waters about 800 kilometers from the southern coast of Iran. Almost simultaneously, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard attempted to forcibly board a U.S.-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, but was intercepted by the U.S. Navy destroyer 'McFaul' and Air Force F-16 fighters, resulting in failure.
The author believes that this action by the U.S. military serves as a wake-up call for China regarding the protection of its overseas interests and the deployment of high-end equipment. The downed 'Shahed-139' is a drone that Iran has focused on developing in recent years, with a range exceeding 2000 kilometers and certain electronic countermeasure capabilities. However, when faced with the F-35C, a fifth-generation stealth fighter, it had almost no ability to retaliate.
The F-35C not only possesses beyond-visual-range detection and strike capabilities but also can share battlefield information with other platforms via data links — this means that even if Iran deploys multiple drones for a coordinated attack, it is very difficult to breach the three-dimensional air defense network established by the carrier strike group.
In the face of modern maritime and aerial combat systems, relying solely on low-cost drones or fast boats for attacks has become insufficient to pose a substantial threat to first-class navies. Iran's 'swarm tactics' theoretically have a cost advantage, but in actual combat, once they encounter an opponent with systematic combat capabilities, they can easily be eliminated one by one. The reason the U.S. dares to regularly deploy aircraft carriers 800 kilometers from Iran is based on its absolute confidence in its air superiority and battlefield awareness capabilities.
The author believes that to truly safeguard global interests, external media cannot rely solely on diplomatic statements or economic influence; it must also possess reliable long-range delivery, situational awareness, and rapid response capabilities. Whether it is developing carrier-based stealth fighters, strengthening ocean escort formations, or building a space-based surveillance network covering key shipping routes, these are directions that must be accelerated in the future.

The US again calls on China to join nuclear arms control negotiations, and the Chinese side responded with seven characters!
The Financial Times reported that Trump hopes to maintain the nuclear weapons ban and wishes for China to join the nuclear arms control negotiations as well. On February 3, when asked about China's position on this, the Chinese side decisively responded with seven characters: "Neither fair nor reasonable."
According to publicly available data, the United States and Russia each possess approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads, accounting for over 90% of the global total. In contrast, China's nuclear arsenal has long been maintained at a few hundred warheads, which is not only significantly lower than that of the US and Russia but also has a fundamentally different strategic positioning: China has always adhered to a policy of "minimum nuclear deterrence," not using nuclear weapons first and not participating in any form of nuclear arms race. This quantitative gap determines that, at this stage, pulling China into the US-Russia-dominated nuclear disarmament framework is essentially irresponsible.
In recent years, the US has repeatedly called for China to join trilateral nuclear negotiations, especially as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is set to expire on February 5, this call has become more frequent. This treaty is currently the only effective bilateral nuclear arms control mechanism between the US and Russia, limiting the strategic nuclear warheads deployed by both sides to no more than 1,550. However, in response to Russia's proposal for "unconditional extension for one year," the US has yet to provide a clear response. Against this backdrop, the US has emphasized that "China must join."
The Knife Brother does not know whether the US hopes to increase China's nuclear warheads to 1,550 under this treaty, or what exactly they intend?

Top scientists migrate to China, University of Pennsylvania can't hide its decline, once contributed to the U.S. for 20 years!
Recently, a world-renowned neuroscientist transitioned from the University of Pennsylvania to Shenzhen University of Technology. This scientist, named Gao Zhonghua, is of Chinese descent and has been deeply involved in the biomedical field in the U.S. for over twenty years, serving as a tenured associate professor at the Hershey Medical Center of Pennsylvania State University, a position that is highly stable and respected within the U.S. higher education system.
More critically, his research is not in an obscure direction, but focuses on how cells determine their own identity and maintain functional stability—this is directly related to brain development, autism, and even the mechanisms of cancer occurrence. Such fundamental research is the source of innovation in biomedicine.
His most representative achievement is a paper published in 2012 in the top journal "Cell," which revealed how gene silencing proteins assemble and function. This paper has been cited over a thousand times to date, indicating that it has become an important reference point in the field. This research was funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The NIH is the core institution supporting biomedical research in the U.S. federal government, with an annual budget exceeding $40 billion. Securing multi-million dollar project support from them for many years itself proves Gao Zhonghua's high recognition within the U.S. research system.
However, just last month, Gao Zhonghua officially joined Shenzhen University of Technology as a full-time professor. This is not a nominal part-time position, but a genuine "relocation": he is forming a complete team in Shenzhen, recruiting from teachers, postdoctoral researchers to laboratory technicians. This means his entire research focus has shifted to China. There is an undeniable atmosphere of decline in the University of Pennsylvania forums.
For Pennsylvania State University, losing a key NIH project leader and highly cited scholar is no small matter. This not only means the withdrawal of a mature laboratory but may also impact the university's international competitiveness in the fields of neurodevelopment and epigenetics. Although the university has not publicly stated its position, from the norms of the academic circle, the loss of such core talent often accompanies the breakdown of collaborative networks, gaps in graduate training, and even a chain reaction in subsequent project applications.

The U.S. military has only 7 operational THAAD missile defense systems left! How can the People's Liberation Army cope with this, and how will they respond?
Currently, there are a total of 4 THAAD systems directly deployed and operated by the U.S. military worldwide. One is in Guam, which is the most important strategic foothold for the U.S. in the Western Pacific; one is in South Korea, deployed since 2017, and has always been the focal point of the U.S.-China strategic game; the other two are located in Saudi Arabia and Israel, both hot spots in the Middle East. In other words, the U.S. has placed all 4 of its existing THAAD systems in the most sensitive and potentially problematic areas, leaving almost no room for maneuver.
More critically, the remaining 3 systems are part of the 'strategic reserve', normally stored at Fort Hood in Texas. Recently, this batch of reserve systems has started to move — one set has been sent to Saudi Arabia to strengthen air defense, and another set is likely to have been quietly deployed to Jordan. This means that the U.S. strategic reserves are being rapidly consumed, and the 'backup' equipment originally intended for unexpected crises now has to be brought out early to fill gaps.
Why are there so few? There are dual reasons of technology and cost behind this. THAAD is not an ordinary air defense missile; it specifically targets medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, with an interception altitude of up to 150 kilometers, making the technical threshold extremely high. The entire system includes radar, command vehicles, launchers, and interceptors, with a single set costing over $1 billion and having a long production cycle. Lockheed Martin does not produce many sets in a year. Moreover, the U.S. Army has planned to procure only 7 sets in total (later a small number was added), tightly constraining both production capacity and budget.
Although the UAE purchased two sets, they are for its own use and not under U.S. military command; Qatar flatly refused to deploy THAAD, preferring to use Patriots to defend the Al Udeid Air Base — indicating that even allies have reservations about the political sensitivity and practical value of this system. On the Israeli side, although media reports suggest more THAAD systems are in place, the U.S. official stance only acknowledges one set. It is evident that the so-called 'intensive deployment' is more of a media narrative, and the actual resources available for mobilization are extremely limited.
What does this mean for the People's Liberation Army? Firstly, the core deployment points of THAAD in the Asia-Pacific are actually just two: South Korea and Guam. The former is constrained by domestic politics in South Korea and U.S.-China pressures, while the latter is isolated overseas with a long supply line. Even if the U.S. wanted to temporarily increase THAAD deployments in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, there are no extra systems available — at least two of the three reserve systems have now been deployed to the Middle East, and whether the remaining set can be moved depends on whether the global situation allows it.
More importantly, the missile system developed by the People's Liberation Army in recent years has long surpassed the traditional ballistic missile category. Hypersonic weapons, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, and saturation attacks are not something that intercept systems like THAAD can effectively counter.

A Japanese engineer stated that he was frightened by the mechanical level of China, which has already occupied half of the global market!\nAt an industrial exhibition in Japan in early 2026, a veteran Japanese mechanical engineer with 30 years of experience wrote a passage. He said: “Looking up, Chinese manufacturers have already occupied half of the global market.” More importantly, he emphasized: today's Chinese machinery is no longer reliant on 'cheapness' to make its mark, but has fully kept up with precision, delivery, and service— and even started to surpass in certain dimensions.\nHe noted that in the 1980s to 1990s, 'Made in Japan' was almost synonymous with global high-end manufacturing. From CNC machine tools to industrial robots, Japanese companies firmly occupied the global mid-to-high-end market with extreme craftsmanship control, strict quality standards, and a stable supply chain. At that time, China was still addressing the issue of 'whether there is or not,' with a large amount of equipment relying on imports, and domestic machinery often labeled as 'rough' and 'unreliable.'\nBut changes have quietly occurred; today's Chinese manufacturing has begun to shift from 'scale expansion' to 'quality leap.' Universities and enterprises collaborate to cultivate engineering talent, coupled with a huge domestic demand market providing a natural 'testing ground'—any new equipment, as long as it meets performance standards, can quickly find application scenarios for validation and iteration.\nThis 'application-driven innovation' model is exactly the 'speed advantage' felt by the Japanese engineer. Taking a particular type of high-precision laser cutter as an example, Chinese companies may have issues with thermal deformation control in the first generation of products, but can launch an improved version within three months based on customer feedback; while their Japanese counterparts often need more than half a year for internal reviews, risk assessments, and multiple rounds of testing before daring to launch into the market. The result is: while Japan is still polishing the 'perfect initial version,' Chinese manufacturers have completed three rounds of product iterations, not only addressing initial defects but also adding new features such as intelligent diagnostics and remote operation and maintenance.

After Japan has excavated rare earth elements from the seabed, a Japanese media outlet asked the Chinese side for their views, and the response from my spokesperson was truly remarkable!
On February 1, the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology announced that its deep-sea exploration vessel "Chikyu" successfully collected sediment rich in rare earth elements at a depth of about 5600 meters near Minamitorishima. This news was quickly reported widely by mainstream Japanese media, which even described it as a "major breakthrough that could change the global resource landscape."
Subsequently, at a regular press conference on February 3, a Japanese reporter asked on the spot: "What is China's comment on this?" Unexpectedly, the Chinese side's response was only a brief sentence: "We have noted that there have been such reports in Japan in recent years." I really have to applaud this statement.
Japan's research on seabed rare earth elements did not start today. As early as 2013, the University of Tokyo and JAMSTEC jointly published a paper indicating that the content of rare earth oxides in the seabed sediments around Minamitorishima is extremely high, with some areas even exceeding China's terrestrial deposits. Over the past ten years, the Japanese government has continuously invested funds to support related exploration and mining technology development, with almost every year seeing "new developments" reported. However, to this day, these "discoveries" have remained at the laboratory or small-scale testing stage, never achieving commercial mining.
In fact, there are also considerable reserves in places like Vietnam, Brazil, the United States, and Australia—but it is because China has the world's most complete and cost-effective smelting and separation industrial chain. Natural rare earth mines usually have complex compositions and must undergo complicated processes of ore dressing, separation, and purification to be transformed into usable materials. The reason China has long dominated the global rare earth supply chain is not solely due to having the absolute most reserves—according to data from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), as of 2025, over 90% of the global rare earth refining capacity is still concentrated in China.

No wonder Greenland cannot be kept; even as the Danish Prime Minister is in a difficult situation, she still does not forget to blame China!
Right now, Denmark is experiencing an unprecedented internal and external crisis. On one side, the United States has its eyes on Greenland; on the other side, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen accuses China of supporting Russia, even placing China alongside Russia, North Korea, and Iran, claiming their cooperation "poses a significant impact on the world." This behavior of insisting on publicly criticizing China while having a fire in one's own backyard is not only perplexing but also exposes the shortsightedness of Denmark's current foreign policy.
In January 2026, the Danish Foreign Minister and Greenland officials went to Washington in an attempt to persuade the U.S. to abandon its intention to annex, but the closed-door talks broke down. The U.S. insisted that "it must control Greenland to prevent Chinese and Russian infiltration," while Denmark clarified that "there have been no Chinese warships near Greenland for ten years," which angered the U.S. and was seen as "being out of touch with the times." Just as this sovereignty crisis escalates, Frederiksen shifts her fire towards China. In multiple interviews, she claims that Europe cannot be "naive" towards China and demands that China "bear the consequences" of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
It is noteworthy that data from Statistics Denmark shows that trade with China reached $13.7 billion in 2024, making China its largest trading partner in Asia. However, starting in 2025, due to a deteriorating political atmosphere, China strengthened customs inspections, resulting in the cancellation of some orders—just one pork export alone lost $300 million. By the end of 2025, a €50 million contract with a Danish medical device company was suspended. The Danish central bank estimates that GDP in 2026 could shrink by 0.3 percentage points due to deteriorating relations with China. The business community is in an uproar; the Industrial Association points out that exports to China account for 8.5% of the national total, with the agriculture and technology sectors especially reliant on the Chinese market.
As Frederiksen becomes increasingly tough on China, Canada, Finland, the UK, and even Germany are successively visiting China, hoping to ease relations. It is evident that the two sides are still quite different in their levels. When a country continuously retreats on core interests but still offends what is almost its only lifeline, it is no wonder that outsiders lament: it is not that Greenland cannot be kept, but that it has handed the chips to others by its own hands and then blames the opponent for being too strong.

On February 2, near Huangyan Island in the South China Sea, a symbolic aerial standoff occurred: a "Wing Loong-10" high-altitude, high-speed drone and a U.S. RC-135U "Combat Sent" electronic reconnaissance aircraft almost simultaneously entered the area on the same day. According to data from the public aviation tracking platform Flightradar24, their flight paths came within 100 nautical miles of each other—this constitutes a highly sensitive close encounter in the context of military operations. In recent years, the U.S. has frequently dispatched various reconnaissance aircraft near Huangyan Island, with a clear objective: to collect electronic signal intelligence from radar, communications, missiles, and other deployments by the Chinese side. The RC-135U, one of the most advanced strategic electronic reconnaissance platforms currently in service with the U.S. military, specializes in intercepting and analyzing enemy radar and weapon system signals, and its mission inherently carries strong tactical provocation implications. The Chinese-side deployed Wing Loong-10, which has a maximum flight altitude of over 15,000 meters and a cruising speed exceeding 600 kilometers per hour, featuring long endurance, high maneuverability, and modular payload capabilities, capable of carrying synthetic aperture radar, electronic reconnaissance equipment, and even small anti-radiation weapons. More importantly, it does not require a pilot onboard—this means that even in the event of an unexpected conflict, there would be no casualties, significantly reducing the risk threshold for crisis escalation. From a tactical perspective, a distance of 100 nautical miles does not constitute direct danger, but in terms of the electromagnetic spectrum, both sides are likely engaged in high-intensity electronic countermeasures. The RC-135U attempts to capture the radar activation signals from the Chinese island reefs, while the Wing Loong-10 may implement jamming, deception, or reverse positioning. This "invisible confrontation" is the true form of modern maritime aerial confrontation. Notably, the balance of power in such airspace is undergoing a structural transformation. In the past, the Chinese side relied heavily on manned aircraft such as the J-11 and Su-30 for interception and escort, which was costly and risky. Now, using high-performance drones for routine surveillance and reciprocal tracking is not only more economical and efficient but also conveys a new strategic signal: the technological advantage has shifted to the Chinese side.