cybersecurity

The proliferation of digital recruitment platforms has paradoxically facilitated a sophisticated surge in employment-based cyber criminality, particularly during peak hiring seasons. This phenomenon, as detailed in recent cybersecurity analyses, involves threat actors leveraging the prestige of established global brands to orchestrate elaborate social engineering schemes. By masquerading as legitimate recruiters, these entities exploit the psychological vulnerability of job seekers, employing a facade of professional urgency and high-compensation incentives to bypass the victim's typical security skepticism.
The operational methodology of these scams is characterized by a strategic shift from traditional email communication to encrypted messaging services such as WhatsApp or Telegram. This transition serves a dual purpose: it bypasses corporate email filters and establishes a false sense of intimacy and immediacy. Once rapport is established, attackers utilize "one-click" confirmation tactics or fraudulent onboarding portals to harvest sensitive personally identifiable information (PII). In more advanced iterations, the scam evolves into financial fraud, where victims are coerced into paying non-existent administrative fees or purchasing equipment from "approved" vendors that are, in reality, controlled by the attackers.
To mitigate these systemic risks, a rigorous verification framework must be adopted by both individuals and organizational security protocols. Academic and professional rigor suggests that any unsolicited recruitment outreach lacking a prior application history should be treated as high-risk. Authentication of the sender’s domain against official corporate registries remains a critical defensive measure. Furthermore, the persistent demand for upfront financial investment or the immediate disclosure of sensitive data remains a definitive indicator of fraudulent intent. Effective defense relies not merely on technological solutions, but on the cultivation of digital literacy and a critical assessment of the recruitment lifecycle.
#CyberSecurity #Awareness #ScamPrevention #Risk
$BNB $XRP $SOL

One of the most impressive features developed by @Dusk is "Citadel," a self-sovereign identity protocol that elegantly solves the industry's biggest KYC dilemma. In the current crypto landscape, users are often forced to sacrifice their personal privacy to meet regulatory requirements. With DUSK, this trade-off is eliminated.
Citadel allows users to prove their identity or eligibility for a service without revealing their actual private data to the service provider or the public ledger. This reusable KYC system is a game-changer for privacy conscious individuals and regulated entities alike.
It puts the user back in total control of their data while ensuring the network remains a safe, compliant environment for everyone. This is the gold standard for how digital identity should work in a decentralized world, balancing freedom with responsibility.

#dusk #Privacy #kyc #CyberSecurity #crypto $DUSK

The U.S. Department of Justice told a federal court on Tuesday that a team linked to Elon Musk and the DOGE project operating within the Social Security Administration (SSA) stored sensitive Social Security data on servers that were never officially approved by the agency. Court filings also say that two team members secretly communicated with an external legal advocacy group connected to efforts to overturn election results in certain states.

Issue surfaced during corrections to sworn statements
According to the Justice Department, the problem came to light while correcting sworn statements submitted last year by senior SSA officials in lawsuits over access to federal data. Those corrections indicated that team members shared information through third-party systems and may have accessed private records that a judge had previously barred them from viewing. The revelations raised serious questions about how the DOGE project actually operated inside the SSA.

Election-related contacts and potential legal violations
Elizabeth Shapiro, a senior Justice Department official, said the SSA referred two DOJ employees for potential violations of the Hatch Act, which prohibits federal employees from using their positions for political purposes. The filing states that both individuals were in contact with a legal advocacy group seeking to overturn election outcomes in specific states.
One of the employees reportedly signed a voter data privacy agreement that could have involved using Social Security numbers to match federal records with state voter rolls. Shapiro said SSA leadership was unaware of the agreement and the external communications at the time earlier court statements were made, and that the agency believed its prior representations—that DOGE focused on fraud detection and technology modernization—were accurate at the time.
The DOJ added that there is no evidence other SSA employees, beyond the involved DOGE members, knew about the advocacy group or the voter-related agreement. Neither the employees nor the advocacy group were named in the filing.

Pentagon involvement and unclear data transfers
Emails reviewed by the Justice Department suggest that personnel from the Department of Defense may have been asked to assist the group with accessing SSA data for comparison with voter lists. It remains unclear whether any data was actually transferred.

Unauthorized servers and handling of restricted data
Shapiro also disclosed that Steve Davis, Musk’s chief adviser associated with the DOGE project, received a copy of a March 3, 2025 email containing a password-protected file with private information on approximately 1,000 individuals drawn from Social Security systems. It is unknown whether Davis accessed the file. Current SSA employees are unable to open it to verify its exact contents.
The SSA continues to assert that DOGE never had direct access to official record systems. However, the DOJ acknowledged it is possible Davis was sent limited outputs derived from SSA systems—a detail included in the corrected court filings.
Documents further state that one DOGE team member briefly accessed private Social Security profiles even after a court barred such access, though Shapiro said the access was never used. In another instance, a different DOGE member had access for two months to a call-center profile containing sensitive information; it is still unknown whether any private data was accessed during that period.

Data sharing via unapproved services
Finally, the Justice Department reported that DOGE members shared data links using Cloudflare, a third-party service not approved for storing SSA data and therefore not subject to the agency’s security controls. The DOJ said this practice exposes systemic weaknesses in how the DOGE project handled sensitive and access-restricted information.

#ElonMusk , #usa , #DOGE , #USPolitics , #CyberSecurity

Stay one step ahead – follow our profile and stay informed about everything important in the world of cryptocurrencies!
Notice:
,,The information and views presented in this article are intended solely for educational purposes and should not be taken as investment advice in any situation. The content of these pages should not be regarded as financial, investment, or any other form of advice. We caution that investing in cryptocurrencies can be risky and may lead to financial losses.“